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Introduction
Sound decision making is a key element of good medi-
cine; thus, decision errors often have clinical importance.
A large body of psychological research has identifi ed a 
number of decision errors and irrational biases in non-
Published in Social Science & Medicine 49 (1999), pp. 215–222. Copyright © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. Used by permission.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02779536
Rationality in medical treatment decisions: 
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Abstract
Objective: To assess residents’ propensity to display the sunk-cost effect, an irrational decision-making bias, in medical 
treatment decisions; and to compare residents’ and undergraduates’ susceptibility to the bias in non-medical, everyday 
behaviors. 
Design: Cross-sectional, in-person survey. 
Setting: Louisiana State University, two locations: Medical Center-Baton Rouge and Main Campus–Psychology 
Department. 
Participants: Internal medicine and family practice residents (N = 36, Mdn age = 27) and college undergraduates (N = 
40, Mdn age = 20). 
Measurements and main results: Residents evaluated medical and non-medical situations that varied the amount of 
previous investment and whether the present decision maker was the same or different from the person who had 
made the initial investment. They rated reasons both for continuing the initial decision (e.g., stay with the medication 
already in use) and for switching to anew alternative (e.g., a different medication). There were two main fi ndings: 
First, the residents’ ratings of whether to continue or switch medical treatments were not infl uenced by the amount of 
the initial investment (p’s > 0.05). Second, residents’ reasoning was more normative in medical than in non-medical 
situations, in which it paralleled that of undergraduates (p’s < 0.05). 
Conclusions: Medical residents’ evaluation of treatment decisions refl ected good reasoning, in that they were not 
infl uenced by the amount of time and/or money that had already been invested in treating a patient. However, the 
residents did demonstrate a sunk-cost effect in evaluating non-medical situations. Thus, any advantage in decision 
making that is conferred by medical training appears to be domain specifi c. 
Keywords: Decision making, Biases, Medical education
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medical domains (Baron, 1994). Medical decision mak-
ing research has sought to uncover some of the parallels 
between cognitive biases which exist in the non-medical 
world and in the medical world (Detmer et al., 1978; El-
stein et al., 1978; Dawson and Arkes, 1987; Elstein, 1988; 
for an inventory of medical decision-making biases, see 
Hershberger et al., 1994). Some of the biases that have 
been shown to infl uence medical judgment include the 
omission bias (Asch et al., 1994), availability bias (Poses 
and Anthony, 1991), hindsight bias (Arkes et al., 1981; 
Dawson et al., 1988), a bias to ignore negative evidence 
when attempting to synthesize information (Mazur and 
Hickam, 1990), framing effects (McNeil et al., 1984) and 
outcome bias (Gruppen et al., 1994). 
For example, Dawson et al. (1988) asked physicians 
attending clinicopathologic conferences to estimate the 
probability of fi ve possible diagnoses. They found that 
physicians who were informed of the correct diagno-
sis prior to making their probability estimates ranked 
it higher in their differential diagnosis than physicians 
who were not told the correct diagnosis beforehand. 
This hindsight bias was especially prevalent in less ex-
perienced physicians. 
One bias which is not represented in the research on 
medical decision making is the escalation, or sunk cost, 
effect (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Brockner, 1992). The 
sunk cost effect occurs when a decision maker contin-
ues to invest resources into a previously selected action 
or plan even after the plan has proven to be the subopti-
mal option. For example, Arkes and Blumer (1985) told 
participants to imagine that they had purchased tickets 
for two non-refundable ski trips on the same weekend. 
Even though they were told to assume further that they 
would enjoy the trip purchased second more, a majority 
of participants chose the trip purchased fi rst, which had 
cost them more money. From an economic perspective, 
choosing the fi rst trip is suboptimal; because the mon-
ey for both trips has been irretrievably sunk, one ought 
to choose the trip that would be more enjoyable. 
The sunk cost effect has been shown to be a robust 
cognitive bias in a variety of non-medical domains, such 
as personal decisions (Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Bornstein 
and Chapman, 1994), investment decisions in business 
(Staw, 1976; Garland, 1990), and employee performance 
evaluations (Bazerman et al., 1982). A number of reasons 
may underlie decision makers’ sunk cost behavior (Born-
stein and Chapman, 1994). The most commonly cited rea-
son for why people display /’ the sunk cost effect is the 
desire not to waste already expended resources (Frisch, 
1993; Bornstein and Chapman, 1994). Decision makers 
may feel that if they abandon the original plan, they will 
be wasting the resources already invested. For example, 
Arkes and Blumer’s subjects may have chosen the more 
expensive, less enjoyable ski trip because they felt that if 
they did not take the trip, the money already spent on it 
would be wasted. 
Decision makers may have other rationales for at-
tending to sunk costs as well. One such reason is the 
desire to teach oneself (or another person) a lesson 
about how to make better decisions in the future; an-
other possible reason is the desire to appear consistent 
in one’s decisions. Learning a lesson is especially likely 
to come into play when one person is making a decision 
on behalf of another (e.g., a parent deciding what a child 
should do), as opposed to making a decision for oneself 
(Bornstein and Chapman, 1994). Consistency is an espe-
cially important motivation for sunk cost behavior when 
decision makers are induced to justify their decisions, 
either publicly or privately (Bobocel and Meyer, 1994). 
Similarly, decision makers who feel personally respon-
sible for an original plan’s consequences are more likely 
to display sunk-cost behavior than when someone else is 
responsible (Staw, 1976; Whyte, 1993; Schoorman and 
Holahan, 1996). 
In this study, we explore the role that the sunk cost 
effect plays in medical decision making. Sunk costs 
could affect several aspects of medical decision mak-
ing. For instance, a physician might be more reluctant 
to change medications after an ineffective trial of a rela-
tively expensive medicine as opposed to an inexpensive 
medicine. Similarly, a practitioner might be less will-
ing to entertain an alternative diagnosis after spending 
several hours or days pursuing an apparently inaccurate 
option than if less time were spent looking at the errone-
ous diagnosis. In this study, we asked whether resident 
physicians would display the sunk cost bias by being 
more likely to recommend continuing with a medical 
management plan when the initial investment was rela-
tively high (compared to when it was relatively low), 
even though patient outcomes would be improved by 
switching to a different management strategy. Because 
personal responsibility for a failed decision infl uences 
one’s tendency to continue with it (Schoorman and 
Holahan, 1996), we also manipulated responsibility by 
varying whether the current treating physician was the 
same as or different from the physician who had made 
the initial treatment decision. 
One characteristic of experts across a variety of 
fi elds is that they tend to make more accurate and reli-
able judgments than novices (Ericsson and Smith, 1991), 
a fi nding that holds true for increasing levels of medical 
expertise (Elstein et al., 1978; Patel and Groen, 1991). 
The expertise literature also indicates that, on the whole, 
the benefi ts of expertise are domain specifi c (Ericsson 
and Smith, 1991). We therefore compared medical resi-
dents’ reasoning about medical scenarios to their reason-
ing about non-medical scenarios. We predicted that the 
residents would be less subject to the sunk cost fallacy 
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when reasoning in their area of expertise than when rea-
soning out of it. 
We predicted that when medical residents did fall 
prey to the sunk cost fallacy, their motivation would 
be to appear consistent rather than to avoid wasting 
resources already invested. Inconsistency in medical 
treatment might be perceived as an implicit admission 
of error and thereby indicate low-quality care. The con-
sequences of perceived sub-standard care are potentially 
severe: malpractice claims, loss of one’s patient popu-
lation or loss of respect from one’s peers, all of which 
could curtail professional advancement. Thus, consis-
tency may be thought of as a good quality, and the need 
for physicians to see themselves in a good light would 
lead them to choose the consistency argument over the 
waste argument when displaying the sunk cost effect. 
The motivation to appear consistent should therefore be 
stronger for physicians in the medical domain than it 
would be in non-medical situations. One reason for this 
tendency may be the “it didn’t happen because of me” 
phenomenon (Detmer et al., 1978). Detmer et al. found 
that physicians tended to estimate mortality rates for an 
entire surgical service to be higher than the physician’s 
own patients’ mortality rates. The researchers felt that 
this might result from “a need to see oneself in a good 
light and yet not distort one’s self-image” (Detmer et al., 
1978, p. 682). 
We also compared residents’ reasoning about non-
medical scenarios to that of undergraduate students. If ex-
pertise gained through medical training transfers to areas 
outside of the resident’s medical expertise, then medical 
residents would be less likely to display the sunk cost 
bias than undergraduates in non-medical situations. On 
the other hand, if expertise is completely domain-specifi c, 
then residents and undergraduates should show equiva-
lent performance on the non-medical scenarios. Thus, 
there are two (non-orthogonal) comparisons that are cen-
tral to the present study: medical residents’ decisions in 
medical versus non-medical situations, and decisions in 
non-medical situations of resident participants versus un-
dergraduate participants. 
Method
Participants
The physician participants were 36 residents (26 
males, 9 females, and one participant who failed to indi-
cate gender) drawn from one internal medicine and two 
family practice residency programs in Baton Rouge, Lou-
isiana. The residents ranged in age from 24 to 45 years old 
(M = 30.23, Mdn = 27), and they had been in residency an 
average of 1.91 years (Mdn = 2). The undergraduate par-
ticipants were 40 undergraduates (9 males and 31 females) 
from Louisiana State University who were between 18 
and 33 years old (M = 20.48, Mdn = 20). No monetary 
incentive was offered in either case; the undergraduates 
received extra course credit for participating. 
Materials and design
Participants rated decision makers’ options in a 
number of hypothetical scenarios (eight for the residents 
and four for the undergraduates). It is not uncommon to 
study decision making by haying participants evaluate 
others’ behavior, in both non-medical (Baron, 1994) and 
medical domains (Gruppen et al., 1994). The sunk cost 
literature has failed to fi nd differences in participants’ 
judgments depending on whether they are asked to make 
decisions themselves or to evaluate another’s decisions 
(Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Bornstein and Chapman, 
1994). 
The four non-medical scenarios were taken from 
those used previously by Bornstein and Chapman (1994); 
see Appendix A for a sample scenario. Four medical sce-
narios were created such that each scenario presented an 
ongoing plan and an alternative course of action, as in 
the non-medical scenarios. For example, in one of the 
cases (see Appendix A), a patient was started on antise-
cretory medication because of gastroesophageal refl ux. 
The medication was ineffective and produced drowsi-
ness. The physician must decide whether to maintain the 
original treatment or discontinue the medication. The 
medical scenarios were developed by the physician au-
thor (ACE) and were reviewed by other physicians for 
their plausibility. 
Two independent variables were varied within each 
scenario. First, the current plan had been initiated either 
by the present decision maker herself or by another per-
son (another physician for the medical scenarios). Sec-
ond, either a high or low level of resources had already 
been invested in the current plan. 
Each non-medical participant read the four non-
medical scenarios, one for each combination of the two 
variables: (1) identity of the original decision maker 
(same vs. other); (2) amount of initial investment (high 
vs. low). Each physician participant read the four non-
medical scenarios as well as the four medical scenarios. 
The four medical scenarios also had representations of 
all combinations of the same two within-subject vari-
ables as described above. The order of the conditions 
for both the medical and non-medical scenarios was 
counterbalanced according to a Latin-square design. 
The scenarios were presented in one of two different 
orders. 
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Procedure
After reading each scenario, participants rated three 
possible responses using a 10-point scale, with 10 repre-
senting “a very good response, the one that [the decision 
maker] should defi nitely follow,” and 1 representing “a 
very bad response, that [the decision maker] should defi -
nitely not follow” (Bornstein and Chapman, 1994). Par-
ticipants were allowed to use any number between 1 and 
10 as often as they chose. The three possible responses, 
which were tailored to fi t each scenario, were as follows: 
“normative” — ignore sunk costs and switch to the new, 
better plan; “waste” — stick with the initial plan so as 
not to waste the resources already invested; and “consis-
tency” — stick with the initial plan to be consistent with 
previous behavior. Each response appeared in each ordi-
nal position at least once in the four scenarios of each type 
(medical and non-medical). 
The entire questionnaire took 20-30 min for the phy-
sicians to complete (8 scenarios) and 10–20 min for the 
non-medical participants to complete (4 scenarios). 
Results
Medical residents
For the residents’ data, we fi rst conducted separate ANO-
VAs on the ratings given to each response (normative, 
waste and consistency) as a function of three within-sub-
ject independent variables: type of scenario (medical or 
non-medical), identity of original decision maker (same 
or other) and amount of resources already invested (high 
or low). 
The normative response received the highest mean 
rating by residents in both the medical and non-medical 
scenarios (see Table 1). Contrary to our prediction, they 
did not rate the consistency response higher than the waste 
response in the medical scenarios. However, the residents 
did rate both the waste and consistency arguments higher 
in non-medical as opposed to medical situations, and the 
normative response was rated higher in medical than in 
non-medical cases (F(1, 32)s > 6.67, p’s < 0.05). This pat-
tern indicates that residents are less susceptible to the sunk 
cost fallacy in medical than in non-medical settings. 
The main effect of scenario type on ratings of the con-
sistency response was qualifi ed by an interaction between 
scenario type and identity of the original decision maker, 
F(1, 32) = 5.61, p < 0.05 (see Fig. 1, left and middle bars). 
For medical cases, the consistency response was rated 
higher when the treating physician had initiated the origi-
nal plan herself than when another physician had; howev-
er, for non-medical scenarios, the reverse was true. Thus, 
the attractiveness of the consistency response in medical 
Fig. 1. Mean ratings of the consistency response as a function of identity of the original decision maker (same vs. other) for both residents (medi-
cal and non-medical scenarios) and undergraduates (non-medical scenarios only). 
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settings appears to be greater when the original decision 
maker and the present decision maker are the same person 
than when they are different. 
There was no main effect of amount of resources al-
ready invested for the waste or consistency arguments, 
F(1, 32)s < 1.75, p’s > 0.19, nor did level of investment 
interact with type of scenario or person making the origi-
nal decision, F(1, 32)s < 3.2, p’s > 0.3. For the consis-
tency response, there was a marginally signifi cant deci-
sion maker by amount of resources interaction, F(1, 32) = 
3.19, p < 0.09. This interaction indicates that consistency 
was rated higher for high than low resources invested 
only in the case where the present decision maker had 
made the original decision. 
For the normative response, there was a marginal 
main effect of resources invested, F(1, 32) = 3.43, p < 
0.08, indicating that the normative response was rated 
somewhat lower when a large amount of resources had 
already been invested. There was no interaction between 
amount of resources invested and type of scenario, F(1, 
32) < 1, p > 0.6, but there was a 2-way interaction be-
tween amount of resources and person making the origi-
nal decision, F(1, 32) = 7.99, p < 0.01, indicating that the 
normative response was rated higher for low resources 
invested only if the original decision had been made by 
the physician himself. In addition, there was a 3-way 
interaction among amount of resources, scenario type, 
and identity of the original decision maker, F(1, 32) = 
10.95, p < 0.005, indicating that the interaction between 
amount of resources and identity of the decision maker 
on ratings of the normative response occurred only for 
the non-medical scenarios (see Table 2). This pattern 
suggests further that the predicted interaction between 
scenario type and amount of resources may occur only 
when the present decision maker made the initial deci-
sion; it fails to occur when someone else made the origi-
nal decision. 
Non-medical scenarios: residents vs. undergraduates
We next compared the responses of both groups of 
participants on the non-medical scenarios. The between-
subjects independent variable was participants (residents 
or undergraduates), and the within-subjects variables 
were identity of the original decision maker (same or 
other) and amount of resources already invested (high 
or low). The dependent variables again were the ratings 
given to each of the three responses, analyzed in separate 
univariate ANOVAs. 
Undergraduates gave higher responses to the non-
normative responses (waste and consistency) than did 
residents, F(1, 68)s > 10.24, p’s < 0.01 (see Table 1). This 
fi nding is another indication that professional training 
may improve reasoning. It should be noted, however, that 
even the undergraduates rated the normative argument 
higher than both the waste and consistency responses. 
Across all participants (both the residents and the 
undergraduates), the waste response was rated higher 
and the normative response lower when a high level of 
resources had already been invested, F(1, 68)s > 6.96, 
p’s < 0.02 (see Table 3). Like the waste response, the 
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consistency response was slightly higher when a high lev-
el of resources had been invested, though this effect was 
not statistically signifi cant, F(1,68) = 2.17, p > 0.14. This 
pattern indicates that participants viewed continuing with 
the original plan as more attractive when they (or some-
one else) had already invested many resources into that 
plan. In other words, both residents and undergraduates 
demonstrated the sunk cost effect in judging non-medical 
situations. 
To test whether the undergraduates showed more of a 
sunk cost effect than the medical residents, we examined 
the interaction between participant group and amount of 
resources invested. There was no such interaction for the 
waste or consistency response, F(1, 68)s < 1, p’s > 0.3. 
This interaction for the normative response was margin-
ally signifi cant, F(1, 68) = 3.16, p < 0.09, suggesting a 
somewhat stronger effect of invested resources for the 
undergraduates (see Table 3). 
Both the undergraduates and the residents rated the 
consistency argument higher when another decision 
maker had made the original decision, F(1, 68) = 12.55, 
p < 0.001 (see Fig. 1, middle and right bars). Thus, for 
non-medical scenarios (for both groups of participants), 
consistency was rated higher when another person had 
made the original decision, whereas, as reported above, in 
medical cases the resident participants rated consistency 
higher when the treating physician herself had made the 
original decision. This fi nding indicates that intra-indi-
vidual consistency with past decisions is valued more by 
physicians evaluating medical decisions, while inter-in-
dividual consistency with past decisions is deemed more 
important in the other settings studied. 
Discussion
The present experiment yielded several interesting 
fi ndings concerning the reasoning of medical residents 
about hypothetical situations in which a person was por-
trayed as having to decide whether to persist with an orig-
inal plan of action or switch to a more cost-effective al-
ternative. First, the residents made fairly rational choices 
overall. They consistently rated the normative argument 
as the most attractive alternative while giving appropri-
ately low ratings to both non-normative responses. Fur-
thermore, their judgments when evaluating treatment op-
tions were not infl uenced by the amount of prior resources 
that had already been invested; that is, they did not dem-
onstrate a sunk cost effect in evaluating medical treatment 
decisions. Second, they were more rational — in the sense 
of viewing switching to the more effective alternative as a 
relatively attractive option, while viewing continuing , the 
failed plan as relatively unattractive — when the decision 
involved choosing a course of medical treatment than 
when it involved everyday behaviors. Third, even though 
consistency was not a very attractive argument overall, 
the residents were more concerned about maintaining 
consistency with a previous medical treatment decision 
when that initial decision had been made by the present 
treating physician than when it had been made by some-
one else. However, they viewed  consistency with a pre-
vious non-medical decision as more important when the 
initial decision had been made by someone else, a pattern 
that was also observed in the undergraduates’ evaluations 
of non-medical decisions. 
Although residents and undergraduates were similar 
in the weight they gave to the consistency rationale for 
continuing with a plan of action in non-medical situa-
tions, there were differences between the two groups of 
participants as well. Specifi cally, the undergraduates gave 
higher ratings to the non-normative responses (i.e., waste 
and consistency) than did the residents. 
Although previous research has documented a num-
ber of cognitive biases in medical decision makers (e.g., 
Elstein et al., 1978; Dawson and Arkes, 1987; Hershberg-
er et al., 1994), the present fi ndings do not provide much 
additional support for the notion that physicians are poor 
reasoners. Most notably, residents’ evaluations of treat-
ment decisions were not infl uenced by the amount of time 
and/or money that had already been invested in treating a 
particular patient; in other words, they did not fall prey to 
the sunk cost effect when judging different treatment op-
tions. Despite the generally robust nature of the sunk cost 
effect in the psychological literature (Arkes and Blumer, 
1985; Brockner, 1992; Bornstein and Chapman, 1994), 
resident participants’ judgments about the optimal course 
of treatment were not infl uenced by previous treatment 
decisions. This encouraging fi nding supports other recent 
research indicating that biases in medical decision mak-
ing may be more limited than previously thought (Chris-
tensen et al., 1995). 
The resident participants did consider it more im-
portant for physicians faced with treatment decisions to 
appear consistent by continuing with a failed treatment 
plan when the physicians themselves had made the ini-
tial decision, compared to when another physician had 
made the initial decision. This fi nding supports previous 
research showing that. personal responsibility increases 
sunk cost behavior (Staw, 1976; Schoorman and Holahan, 
1996) and that the desire to appear consistent — either to 
others or to oneself — is a powerful motive for behavior 
(Bobocel and Meyer, 1994); In deciding on medical treat-
ments, physicians must consider not only what is rational 
— that is, the medically optimal strategy — but also what 
is socially desirable. Because inconsistency in medical 
treatment might be perceived as an implicit admission of 
error on the physician’s part, it could lead to a host of 
undesirable social consequences, such as future litigation 
and loss of professional respect and opportunities. These 
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effects would likely be even more salient in real situa-
tions, as opposed to the hypothetical decisions used in the 
present study. 
Unfortunately, the residents’ generally normative 
behavior in medical situations did not generalize to non-
medical settings. Although the medical and non-medical 
situations were not directly comparable, research on the 
sunk cost effect has found it to be very robust across a va-
riety of situations (e.g., Arkes and Blumer, 1985; Larrick 
et al., 1990; Bornstein and Chapman, 1994). The medical 
and non-medical scenarios were analogous in the sense 
that both scenario types presented participants with situ-
ations in which an initial decision had proven unsuccess-
ful, and a subsequent decision was then required either to 
continue with the original strategy or to switch to a more 
optimal alternative. In evaluating non-medical situations, 
residents rated sub-optimal responses higher (and the 
normative response lower) than when they were evaluat-
ing medical situations; furthermore, they demonstrated a 
sunk cost effect in judging everyday decisions. Although 
residents found the waste and consistency responses to 
everyday decisions less attractive than did undergradu-
ates, they were nonetheless infl uenced by the amount of 
the original investment. In fact, undergraduates and resi-
dents were equally likely to be infl uenced by the size of 
a prior investment when reasoning about everyday situa-
tions; that is, there was no signifi cant interaction between 
participant group and level of sunk cost. Thus, it appears 
that some aspect of residents’ training may inoculate them 
against the sunk cost bias within the medical domain, but 
that they fail to apply this higher reasoning standard to the 
same degree in other settings. 
Interestingly, consistency was viewed as a more at-
tractive rationale for continuing the original plan in non-
medical scenarios (by both groups of participants) when 
someone else had made the initial decision than when the 
same decision maker had. This reversal provides evidence 
that physicians reason differently within their domain of 
expertise than outside it. Although some evidence exists 
suggesting that training in reasoning can transfer across 
situations (Nisbett et al., 1987; Larrick et al., 1990), the 
present results support the more common fi nding that the 
benefi ts of expertise are domain specifi c (Ericsson and 
Smith, 1991). 
We can only speculate as to how medical training 
might serve to prevent the sunk cost effect in making 
medical decisions. Residents probably are not following 
an abstract principle about ignoring sunk cost; for if they 
were, they would show equivalent reasoning in the medi-
cal and non-medical scenarios. It also seems unlikely that 
residents are following an explicit domain-specifi c rule 
about ignoring sunk costs. Instead, they may be following 
domain-specifi c rules about which aspects of the situation 
to attend to. Decision principles that emphasize control-
ling the quality of care, like “Pick the most effective treat-
ment” or “Maximize the patient’s outcome,” would result 
in no sunk cost effect even though these principles do not 
explicitly mention sunk costs. However, because these 
principles are medicine-specifi c, they would be less likely 
to be applied to everyday decisions. The current study did 
not query residents as to the reasons or principles behind 
their decisions (except by asking them to rate their agree-
ment with the three arguments provided). Future research 
needs to question physicians in a more open-ended man-
ner as they actually engage in treatment decisions. 
In conclusion, the present study yielded three major 
fi ndings: First, residents did not exhibit a sunk cost effect 
in evaluating treatment decisions; that is, their evalua-
tion of different courses of treatment was not affected by 
how much time or money had been invested in the ini-
tial treatment regimen. Second, the residents’ reasoning 
about medical situations appeared to refl ect a sense that 
physicians should be consistent in their patient manage-
ment decisions. This desire for consistency might refl ect 
a belief that changing treatments would be perceived as 
an admission of error . Third, this relatively normative 
reasoning on the part of the residents did not generalize 
to their non-medical decisions, in which their judgments 
— like those of undergraduates — did demonstrate a 
sunk cost effect. Thus, any advantage conferred by medi-
cal training in avoiding the sunk cost effect is limited to 
the medical domain. Overall, the present fi ndings offer 
both good news and bad news: The good news is that 
doctors are not infl uenced by sunk costs in evaluating 
medical treatment decisions. The bad news is that this 
capacity for optimal reasoning does not generalize to 
non-medical situations. 
Appendix A. Sample scenarios
Both of the following scenarios are in the same original 
decision maker-low sunk cost condition. Alternate .condi-
tions (i.e., other original decision maker and high sunk 
cost) are shown in parentheses. 
Non-medical type
Agatha decides that she wants to take cello lessons 
(Agatha’s husband decides to give Agatha a cello and 
cello lessons for her birthday). She (he) spends US$100 
(US$1,000) on a beginner cello and an additional US$40 
(US$200) on the fi rst month (3 months) of cello lessons. 
After 1 month (3 months) of lessons, Agatha realizes that 
she no longer enjoys the cello and wants to stop taking 
lessons. That is, it is almost certain that if Agatha signs up 
for more lessons, she will not enjoy them and will never 
enjoy playing the cello. What should Agatha do? 
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Medical type
Ms. S., a 54-year-old female with a history of heartburn, 
comes to Dr. Gordon’s offi ce. Ms. S. had an upper GI series 
done 6 weeks ago which showed that she had gastroesopha-
geal refl ux (Ms. S. states that 6 weeks earlier her daughter’s 
doctor ordered an upper GI series on her which showed that 
she had gastroesophageal refl ux). Dr. Gordon (her daughter’s 
doctor) gave her a prescription for Stopcid, an antisecretory 
medicine, which she has to take twice a day and is associated 
with some drowsiness. She purchased a four-month supply 
for US$40 (US$400). Ms. S. has been taking the medicine 
for 2 months and returns to Dr. Gordon’s offi ce because she 
is still having heartburn symptoms and is tired all the time. 
What should Dr. Gordon do? 
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